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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

501-XX

27 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, SCC Meeting on Horn of Africa,
26 January 1978, 7:00-8:45 p.m., White House Situation Room

PARTICIPANTS:

State:
Cyrus Vance

CIA:
Stansfield Turner

Defense:
Harold Brown
General George Brown (JCS)

NSC:
Zbigniew Brzezinski (Chairman)
Paul B. Henze (Notetaker)

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of the meeting was to review the latest developments in the Horn, consultations with friendly governments and recent contacts with the Soviets and Cubans. Possibilities for U.S. initiative in the political, diplomatic, and military spheres were reviewed. [REDACTED] (b)(7)

The problem of publicity was discussed. Congressional interest was also discussed. The Chairman noted that the President had recently sent messages to Brezhnev and Mengistu. It was the consensus of the group that the U.S. Government should be cautious about taking actions that would in themselves encourage a sense of crisis or confrontation with the Soviets or that would commit us prematurely to positions that could limit our flexibility. It was agreed that the following principles should guide actions during the next few weeks:

- We will continue efforts to impress upon the Soviets the seriousness with which we look upon their involvement in the Horn and the political problems which it causes for us.
- We will endeavor to broaden contact and dialogue with the Ethiopians in hope of encouraging them to reserve some freedom of action.

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by N. Manan, National Security Council Zbigniew Brzezinski

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- We will continue to seek advice from our allies and other friendly governments to enlist their aid in impressing upon the Soviets *& Cuba* our serious concern, but we will be cautious about encouraging those who are inclined to help the Somalis to make commitments that they would expect us to back up.
- We will accelerate study of our own capabilities and those of other governments to intervene in the situation in ways that could complicate or make more costly the Soviet/Cuba intervention, but we will underwrite no action at this time.
- We will consider underscoring our concern by military movements designed to have psychological and political impact.

The following specific requirements were set for study/action with results to be reported back as soon as possible:


- Presidential letters to Giscard, Tito, Obasanjo, Perez and Desai will be sent. Messages to other Heads of State/Government will be considered later.

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- The JCS will prepare plans for deployment of a naval task force in the Red Sea as soon as possible.

study only

- Through military  the Iranian, Saudi, Egyptian and Sudanese governments will be sounded out on their capabilities and intentions for providing support to Somalia. We will not go beyond these discussions until we again talk to Sadat.

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- An ambassador to Ethiopia will be dispatched in the near future.
- No action will be taken to inform the Ethiopians that pipeline military items will be held up.
- A determined effort will be made to avoid unnecessary publicity about the Administration's stance and actions in respect to the Horn.